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This study investigates the effect of characteristics of board of directors 
and audit committee strength on audit fees internal control quality.  
In this study, 84 companies listed on the Tehran Stock Exchange were 
evaluated from 2014 to 2016. Panel regression model and panel logistic 
regression model were used for testing hypotheses related to audit fees 
and the weaknesses of internal control quality, respectively.  
Results showed that there is no significant relationship between the 
authority of board of directors and audit committee and the 
independence board and audit committee expertise and internal 
control quality weakness and also between the board power and audit 
fees. There is a significant relationship, however, between the board 
independence and audit committee authority, expertise, as well as the 
audit fees. Furthermore, results indicated that there is no significant 
relationship between board effort and audit fees and internal control 
quality weakness. 
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El efecto de las características del Comité de 
Auditoría y de la Junta Directiva sobre los 
honorarios de auditoría y la calidad del control 






Este estudio investiga el efecto de las características de la fortaleza de la junta 
directiva y del comité de auditoría sobre la calidad del control interno de los 
honorarios de auditoría. 
En este estudio, un total de 84 empresas que cotizan en la Bolsa de Teherán 
se evaluaron de 2014 a 2016. El modelo de regresión de panel y el modelo de 
regresión logística de panel se utilizaron para probar hipótesis relacionadas 
con los honorarios de auditoría y las debilidades de la calidad del control 
interno, respectivamente. 
Los resultados mostraron que no existe una relación significativa entre la 
autoridad de la junta directiva y el comité de auditoría y la experiencia de la 
junta de independencia y del comité de auditoría y la debilidad de la calidad 
del control interno y también entre el poder de la junta y los honorarios de 
auditoría. Sin embargo, existe una relación significativa entre la 
independencia de la junta y la autoridad del comité de auditoría, la 
experiencia y los honorarios de auditoría. Además, los resultados indicaron 
que no existe una relación significativa entre el esfuerzo de la junta y los 
honorarios de auditoría y la debilidad de la calidad del control interno. 
 
Palabras clave: honorarios de auditoría, calidad de control interno, junta directiva, 
comité de auditoría.  
Clasificación JEL: D21; G32; L21.  
















1. Introducción.  
 
Carcello, Hermanson, Neal and Riley (2002) described the audit fee as the reflector of economic costs 
of competent auditors and declared from the auditor point of view that auditors, by balancing the costs 
of their available resources (costs of performing more audit) and their future losses due to legal debts, 
seek for a way to minimize total costs. More auditing process will decrease the chance of probable loss 
by auditors and represent the volume of audit operation, which minimize the total costs. One of the most 
important factors affecting the amount of audit fee is the board power. Historically, negotiation on audit 
fees has always been faced with a concern that auditors are more inclined to play managerial roles 
instead of supporting the capital market (BRC, 1999; SEC, 2003). Some rules were established to restore 
the investors’ trust to financial statements and the audit committee is directly responsible for the 
determination of the external auditor fees (SOX, 2002).   
 
However, some auditors reported that management will continue its monitoring role, though the 
audit committee is legally in charge such a function (Cohen, Krishnamoorthy & Wright, 2010). 
Therefore, in case we assume that the audit committee has the limit of managerial influence during audit 
fee negotiation, the current rules may give a false confidence to the investment. We compare the power 
and influence of the board and audit committee on the audit fees by presenting an approach concerning 
the urgency of legal liability of audit fee for the audit committee. Moreover, any alteration in fees will 
be assessed along with the inflation process, in that the influence of audit committee and the board could 
be realized more easily during this period by an ongoing test. Inflation is introduced as an external shock 
and, at the same time as an incompatible pressure to audit fees negotiations. Contracts that lead to the 
decline of economic profit are known as pressure to the decrease of expenses (Cheffers and Whalen, 
2011; Christensen, Omer, Sharp & Shelley 2013; Ettredge, Fuerherm & Li, 2014; Reason, 2010a).  
 
In most cases, the decrease of economic profit as a result of increase in the risk of bankruptcy, 
probable increase of potential earning of management, and decrease of internal controls could heighten 
the audit risk (Kane, Richardson & Graybeal 1996; ACFE, 2009; Das, Shroff & Zhang, 2009). The high 
risk of auditing asks for more auditing efforts and this is the indicative of the increasing pressure to 
heighten the audit fee (Bedard & Johnstone, 2004; Christensen et al., 2013; Doogar, Rowe & Sivadasan, 
2013). The bargaining power of the board representative and the audit committee in negotiations for the 
audit fee is the ability of auditor in salary and insurance or denying the auditor (Moore, Tetlock, Tanlu 
& Bazerman, 2006). However, the more the bargaining power of each board representative or audit 
committee member the higher the chance of being accepted. Other features of an audit service applicant, 
including the size, financial situation, complexity and the like contribute to the audit fee (Simunic, 1980; 
O'Keefe, Simunic & Stein, 1994; Bédard & Johnstone, 2004). Study investigates how the board and 
audit committee power could affect the audit fee and uses other effective factors on fee as controlling 
items in model. Internal controls in firms are related to assessment of reliability of firms' financial 
statements and assessing the achievement of strategic goals and firm operation and also assess the ability 
performing the firms' rules. Internal controls at company level comprise the evaluation of financial 
report reliability, strategic objectives and company operations availability, as well as rules and 
regulations performance ability. Internal control is an integral section of a company management, which 
includes programs, methods and procedures of the organization in achieving its mission and its micro 
and macro goals (Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government, 1999). Section 404 of 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act (U.S. House of Representatives, 2002) obligated auditors to comment about the 
effectiveness of firms’ internal controls on financial statements (ICFR) to be ensured that the financial 
reporting policies and financial statement designing procedures are reliable. The aim of report (ICFR) 
is to inform the users of financial statements about any faults in firms reporting system for producing 
financial statements (PCAOB, 2004). Special aspects of corporate governance including institutional 
ownership, auditor selection and audit committee independence are related to probability of receiving 
brief internal control comments (Ashbaugh-Skaife, Collins & Kinney, 2007; Krishnan, 2005; Zhang, 
Zhou & Zhou, 2007).  
 
Lack of study on the variety of boards is surprising, in that the board is on the head of an 
organizational, monitoring, and controlling system (Fama & Jensen, 1983). Therefore, some board 
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characteristics may be connected to internal control quality. Since the power of internal control has a 
significant relationship with management philosophy, biased manager are interested in designing and 
using of weaker internal control system and abuse weak points of internal control systems to invest in 
high risk projects (Ogneva, Subramanyam & Raghunandan, 2007). Furthermore, Fernández and 
Arrondo (2005) reported an indirect relationship between managerial ownership and foreign managers’ 
proportion, which shows the reduction of monitoring function of foreign managers on internal control 
systems with bias increase. This study investigates how the board power contributes to internal control 
quality and uses other effective factors as controlling items. 
 
2. Theoretical framework, related studies and hypotheses development. 
 
In past, most managers preferred the foreign auditors and negotiated for the audit fee with them (BRC, 
1999). Under such circumstances, the main concern is that if managers control the fees, auditors may 
not be motivated for an impartial audit. Hence, we need a method and regulations to transfer the 
controlling responsibility of foreign auditors from management to the audit committee. Since 1990, BRC 
declared that the audit committee is in charge of foreign auditor but said nothing about the fee (BRC, 
1999). In 2000, SOX completed BRC’s recommendation and assigned the responsibility of setting 
companies’ audit fee to the audit committee (SOX, 2002, section 301-2). SEC delegated the final 
responsibility to the audit committee, caused the interests of foreign auditors to be in line with the 
corporate shareholders, and elevated the trust of stock buyers to auditors’ independence (SEC, 2003).  
 
Although SOX revolved the final right of negotiation responsibility and determination of foreign 
auditors to the audit committee, these rules may not be sufficient to nullify the organizational contracts 
and the relationship between the auditor and the board (Doty, 2011). Therefore, the board could affect 
and decide on the audit fee through unscheduled meetings or informal negotiation sessions with the 
audit committee (Cohen et al., 2010). As a controlling tool in the company, the board combination is the 
determinant of board power. Thus, board combination is an important factor to explain members’ ability 
to do their duties and to improve company performance. The board combination is measured by the 
portion of unbounded managers. The unbounded member of the board has no executive position. 
Unbounded members of the board help the controlling and supervising measures of the executives and 
decrease company representative costs. Independent boards purchase high quality audit services in order 
to protect the capital, reputation, avoiding of legal debt, and protecting shareholders interest. Hence, 
high quality boards seek for high quality audit and increased audit efforts to protect the interests of 
management and shareholders (Leventis & Dimitropoulos, 2010). By casting a closer look, we can see 
that internal control is a useful tool to solve many potential problems (Baltaci & Yilmaz, 2006). Primary 
investigations (Ashbaugh-Skaife et al., 2007) substantiate the relationship between weak points and the 
characteristics of a company, complexity, organizational changes, size, profitability, and resource 
investment.  
 
A possible supervisory mechanism is corporate internal control system. McMullen et al. (1996) 
presented two reasons why internal control report by management can improve internal controls that 
both reasons could be evaluated with supervision mechanism and could decrease company’s Agency 
cost. Firstly, such an internal control reporting could increase the top management to the internal control 
of company, which in turn draws the attention of top management toward the internal control system as 
a whole. Secondly, the internal control reporting could cause a better internal control. 
 
2.1. The power of audit committee. 
 
Galinsky, Magee, Gruenfeld, Whitson and Liljenquist (2008) declared that power is an exclusive feature 
of penetration, in that it is penetrating into actions or controlling. Some studies concluded that in line 
with demands for extra efforts of auditors, there is a positive relationship between audit fee and audit 
committee expertise (Carcello et al., 2002; Abbott, Parker, Peters & Raghunandan, 2003; Vafeas & 
Waegelein, 2007; Hay, 2013). However, Krishnan and Visvanathan (2009) stated such a relationship is 
negative and inverse for companies with high earning management risk, which is in accordance with 
audit committee demand for more attempt to detect the risk. Griffin et al. (2008) and Bedard and 
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Johnstone (2004) found in common that there is a mutual effect between audit risk and long-term 
supervisory corporate predictions. 
 
In past, selecting an external auditor and negotiating about audit fee was among the management 
duties (BRC, 1999). Such a perspective affected auditors’ motivation and independence. However, the 
problem would be about the influence of the board power of on the audit fees. 
 
According to investigations, no study has been conducted on the effect of the board power on 
audit fee in inflation conditions. Carcello et al. (2002) studied the board characteristics and audit service 
fees. One of the most important factors affecting the amount of audit fee is the board power. Regarding 
the negotiation records of audit service fee by management, there is a doubt that instead of being the 
advocates of the capital market, auditors in most companies are a managerial tool committee (BRC, 
1999; SEC, 2003). Dao, Raghunandan and Rama (2012) investigated the effect of shareholders’ 
opinions on auditor selection, audit service fee, and audit quality. Audit Committee has periodical 
relation with auditors and the board faces longer audit process, instead (Knechel, 2007; Hellman, 2011). 
Therefore, the financial board could affect the services fee through the confirmation of direct 
negotiations or formal interactions with audit committee (Cohen et al., 2010). McCracken et al. (2008) 
concluded that even after the SOX statement, the board continued its penetration whether to choose, 
retain, or dismiss the auditors. 
 
Cohen et al. (2010), Fiolleau et al. (2013) and Dhaliwal et al. (2014) came to the same conclusion, 
as well. Harris (2008) and Reason (2010b) carried out studies about the role of the board in determining 
the audit fee and concerning the board penetration concluded that the board could affect the audit fee 
using a set planned professional negotiation sessions. Contracts, which cause the economic profit to be 
decreased were known as pressure for to cut expenses (Cheffers & Whalen, 2011; Christensen et al., 
2013; Ettredge et al., 2014; Reason, 2010a). Most of the time, the decrease of economic profit could 
cause the increase of auditing risk through increasing the risk of bankruptcy, the potential earnings of 
management, and decreasing the internal control (Kane et al., 1996; ACFE, 2009; Das et al., 2009). The 
risk of high quality auditing calls for more auditing attempt and this requires more pressure to heighten 
the audit fees (Bedard & Johnstone, 2004; Christensen et al., 2013; Doogar et al., 2013). By considering 
the conducted research studies and importance of the board function, we supposed that the more 
powerful the board, the lower audit cost would be set. So, the first hypothesis is postulated as following: 
 
H1: There is a significant relationship between board member powers' and audit fees. 
 
Tsui et al. (2001) declared that there is a negative relationship between the audit cost and board 
independence. Chan et al. (2013) investigated the influence of audit committee independence and the 
board members on audit service fees. Carcello et al. (2002) stated that one of supervisory tools to 
decrease representative problems between managers and owners is to employ unbounded board 
members. The unbounded members are professional managers specialized in decision control. Such 
managers purchase high quality audit services to protect the capital, reputation, their own and 
shareholders’ interest and to avoid legal debts. Furthermore, Ramdani and Witteloostuijn (2010) 
concluded that the more independent managers could do the managerial supervision tasks more 
effectively. 
 
Leventis and Dimitropoulos (2010) investigated the pricing system of audit, earning quality and 
board independence services for 97 companies which the result showed that there is a position 
relationship between auditing independence and the pricing of audit services. Moreover, there is a 
positive relationship between the pricing of audit services and earning management and these results are 
for smaller companies. We expect that the unbounded managers be more inclined toward high quality 
audits and this would cause the audit service fees to be set at a higher level.  
 




Hence, by considering the abovementioned probable relationships and effects of the board on 
audit fee, we can explain the third hypothesis as follows: 
 
H3: There is a significant relationship between the board effort and audit fees. 
 
In late1990s, BRC suggested that the final power and authority for selecting an independent 
auditor is the audit committee, but dictated no policy for the audit fees (BRC, 1999). In 2002, SOX 
modified the BRC’s theory and made the audit committee totally responsible for determining audit fees 
(SOX, 2002). Some regulations were set to restore investor's trust to financial reports and made the audit 
committee is directly responsible for this purpose (SOX, 2002).  
 
Nevertheless, some auditors express that although the audit committee is legally is charge, 
management is still active in controlling the auditors’ relationship (Cohen et al., 2010). Thus, the current 
rules may establish a false trust for investors, such that the audit committee has only a restricted 
penetration along the negotiations on audit cost (Beck & Mauldin, 2014).  
 
SEC governmental regulations has made the audit committee the final respondent for auditors and 
this would enhance their motivation and independence and could bring about more investors’ trust to 
auditors (SEC, 2003). Zulkarnain et al. (2007) carried out a research on the functions of audit committee 
and its roles in selecting an external auditor and found that the committee is a medium between internal 
and independent auditors and is considered as the board of directors. In addition, its activities include 
assessing auditors’ appointment, the general scope of auditing, audit results, internal financial control, 
and financial information to be published. Furthermore, it establishes an accounting committee in the 
company and casts a critical supervision on financial reports and accounting processes. In addition to 
selecting auditors, wage determination and retain or dismiss of auditors are among the functions of an 
audit committee. Therefore, audit committee reinforces auditor independence. In fact, auditor is more 
competent, efficient, and independent in case the audit committee is in charge for appointment and wage 
determination. Beasley et al. (2009) declared that within an interview sessions with audit committee 
members, about 31% said that most formalities of audit committee are ignored by its structure and 96% 
said that the audit committee serves its supervisory role. Carcello et al. (2011) said that a more powerful 
audit committee can decrease the audit costs by low assessment of audit risk or may increase the audit 
cost by asking the external audit for more attempt. Krishnan and Visvanathan (2009) obtained some 
documents, which claim that the audit committee is sensitive to risk. Furthermore, Brown and Wright 
(2008) and Dezoort et al. (2008) concluded that when the audit committee has more power it is likely to 
back up the auditors’ stance.  Accordingly, by this hypothesis we focused on the relative effects of audit 
committee's power on the cost of audit fee and expected that the more power of the audit committee will 
bring about more support of the external auditor and a higher audit fee.  
 
H4: There is a significant relationship between power of audit committee members and audit fees.  
 
Carcello et al. (2002), Abbott et al. (2003), Vafeas and Waegelein (2007) and Hay (2013) found 
that there is a positive relationship between audit fee and the specialization of audit committee in line 
with their request for more efforts. In contrast, Krishnan and Visvanathan (2009) conducted another 
research, the result of which illustrated that there is a negative relationship between audit fee and audit 
committee specialization, because their results were in line with low assessment of audit risk. Karim 
and Moizer (1996) assessed effective criteria on audit fee in Bangladesh and concluded that big 
companies use famous auditors, because they believe that these institutes use specialist auditors for high 
quality audits. Therefore, these companies are ready to pay more fees to get a better face in front of from 
investors.  
 
H5: There is a significant relationship between the specialty of audit committee members and audit fees.  
 
Jensen (1993) expressed that if executive managers induce their power to control the board, then 
the freedom of thought and action of all members would be influenced unfavorably and process of 




The hypothesis of the probability of designing weaker internal control systems and misusing them 
by biased managers to raise the investment rate in unreliable and risky projects was tested (Chen and 
Steiner, 1999; Ogneva et al., 2007). Moreover, the hypothesis of higher motivation of experienced and 
older managers in performing organizational duties, like minimizing the weaknesses of internal control 
system was assessed, as well (Stevens et al., 1978). Since power of internal control has a significant 
relationship with management philosophy, biased managers are more inclined toward the establishment 
and use of weaker internal control systems and misuse this faulty function to invest in risky projects 
(Ogneva et al., 2007).  
 
H6: There is a significant relationship between power of the board members and the weaknesses of 
internal control.  
 
Fernández and Arrondo (2005) reported an indirect relationship between managerial ownership 
and the proportion of external managers, which is indicative of the decline of supervisory performance 
of external managers on internal control system with a rise in degree of biasing. In the present study, we 
investigate the relationship between the board specifications and different kinds of weakness points in 
internal control systems and their severity, which is the main subject of recent studies (Hoitash et al., 
2011; Ogneva et al., 2007). Previously, U.S executive managers had special an ability to attract external 
managers and obedient internal managers in their board (Thomas, 2004). 
 
In this condition, a biased executive manager should compromise with the board capabilities in 
monitoring managerial decisions. Managerial power theory shows that the power of executive could 
affect the process of rewarding and the more powerful managers usually get more rewards and shares 
(Henderson et al., 2010). Finally, Chidambaran et al. (2010) observed that there is a direct relationship 
between the board communication and CEOs and probability of fraud. We can infer from the data that 
by decreasing the internal quality control level and corporate monitoring systems, and not using them 
for powerful CEOs to reach their personal interests is a possible and simple action. 
 
Bedard (2006) conducted a study about interior control obligations related to article 302 and 404 
of Sarbanes–Oxley Act of 2002 concerning the improvement of earnings quality using unexpected 
discretionary accruals as a measuring tool and found that such unexpected discretionary accruals are 
more in the year the internal control weaknesses were disclosed, because such faulty points increases 
management opportunism. The financial statements may have some defects for earning management 
through intentional distortion in discretionary accruals and by comparing the Acts 302 and 404 we could 
see that that the discretionary accruals are more in 302, but for companies with effective internal control 
report in 404 this amount was less. Generally, results indicated that the legal regulations of Sarbanes–
Oxley Act for internal control could lead to the improvement of earning quality. 
 
Daniel et al. (2008) investigated the reaction of capital market to execution of section 302 and 
404 by companies and examined whether the predicted earning and additional expenses have changed 
after the disclosure of weak points or not. They included that section 302 presents useful information 
and section 404 has no significant effect on stock (share) price or the investment expenses. Chan et al. 
(2005) conducted a study entitled, “earning management and corporate collective return which disclose 
the significance of internal control weaknesses according to section 404 of Sarbanes-Oxley Act”. The 
purpose of their research was to examine the companies, which disclose their internal control 
weaknesses according to section 404. Their results showed that, their earning management is more and 
their return profit is less compared with other companies. 
 
H7: There is a significant relationship between board members’ independence and the weaknesses of 
internal control quality.  
 
In addition, regarding expressed relationships and probable effects of the board on internal control 




H8: There is a significant relationship between the board effort and the weaknesses of internal control 
quality.  
 
Krishnan (2005) studied the period when the SOX act has not been passed and the internal control 
problems were recorded only in K-8 and were disclosed only for companies with changing auditors. 
Using collected and recorded information in K-8, he concluded that independent audit committee and 
audit committee with more financial specialization are more probable to have less internal control 
problems (Krishnan, 2005). Regarding the importance of internal controls and since internal controls 
are applied under audit committee‘s supervision and affect the company functionality, so it is expected 
that the power and features of audit committee and the board affect the internal controls quality. 
 
H9: There is a significant relationship between the power of audit committee and weaknesses of internal 
controls quality. 
 
Audit committee quality, certain or more financial expertise particularly, financial or nonfinancial 
accounting expertise are among the important factors of internal control weaknesses (Zhang et al., 2007). 
To improve the effectiveness of audit committee, the BRC committee recommended that each audit 
committee should have at least a member with financial expertise and this could emphasize on the 
significance of knowledge and expertise of the financial committee. In section 407, the SOX states that 
companies should disclose the financial expertise of their audit committee members through the 
periodical reports and if there is no such specialties, they should explain why, because such information 
is important to confront the complexity of financial reporting (Kalbers & Fogarty, 1993) and to decrease 
probability of representing financial reports (Abbott, Parker & Peters, 2004). Furthermore, DeZoort and 
Salterio (2001) concluded that audit committee members with more financial expertise could better 
understand the auditors’ view and support the auditor in his/her confrontation with management opinion 
on non-expert members of the committee. Zhang et al. (2007) investigated the relationship between 
audit committee quality, auditor independence, and disclosure of weak points of internal control after 
the provision of Sarbanes-Oxley act. They classified several samples of companies with internal control 
defects based on type of industry, size and corporate performance and compared the items with that of 
companies with no defects, then evaluated each factor of audit committee quality and auditor 
independence for each company. Their results showed that there is a relationship between audit 
committee quality, auditor independence, and weaknesses of internal control. Most of the classified 
companies as companies with weak points of internal control have less experienced audit committee 
members. Additionally, most classified companies with internal control defects enjoy auditors that are 
more independent. Most companies that have changed their auditors recently, have weakness points, as 
well. Therefore, regarding the conducted studies we concluded that the more the audit committees with 
financial expertise, the higher the quality of the internal control.  
  
H10: There is a significant relationship between the expertise of audit committee members and weakness 
of internal control quality. 
 
Asthana and Boone (2012) conducted a study about auditing unnatural costs and audit quality (Ge 
& McVay 2005; Doyle, Ge & McVay, 2006) and concluded that a weak internal control of material is 
more probable for small, unprofitable, complex and growing corporates. Doyle, Ge and McVay (2007) 
studied whether such important weak points of internal control are more common in smaller, newly 
established, financially weak, or growing companies or not. They also evaluated to see whether such 
factors are different at account or corporate level or not and which suffers from the weak point more. 
They concluded that internal control problems are more serious in newly established companies, which 
are financially weak, while weak points of internal control are less at account level and these companies 
are safer in terms of financial operations. Ge and McVay (2005) found that disclose their major defects 
in internal control due to the obligations of Sarbanes-Oxley Act are more complicated, smaller, and less 
profitable. Doyle et al. (2007) confirmed the results of Ge and McVay (2005) also showed that 
companies with weak internal control are younger, growing, or reorganizing. Ashbaugh et al. (2007) 
came to the same conclusion showed that companies with major defects in internal control have more 
complicated operations and have been recognized recently and also the audit risk of these companies 
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(systematic risk) indicates an increasing trend and they have less financial sources for investment in 
internal control. Hermanson, Ivancevich and Ivancevich (2008) revealed that market reaction is negative 
to main defects of internal control, which are disclosed in accordance with the regulations of section 
302 of Sarbanes-Oxley Act. 
 
3. Research Methodology.  
 
The aim of present study is to investigate the impact of audit committee power and the board of directors 
on audit fee and the weakness of internal control quality in companies. Accordingly, some financial 
variables are diagnosed as to the employed model. The statistical population of present study is listed 
companies in Tehran stock Exchange from all industries from 2014 to 2016. Sample of the study 
regarding the title is elimination sampling, through which the selected companies with respect to 
limitations listed companies on Tehran stock Exchange with the following specifications: 
 
1. Companies should not be affiliated with banks, holdings, financial intermediaries. This is because 
such companies are different from other companies in terms of nature of activities and the 
classification of financial statement items. 
2. Company’s transactions should not be stopped completely during the research period (company’s 
symbol excluded from the exchange). 
3. Companies should be listed on the Tehran Stock Exchange at least from 2014. 
4. All required data should be accessible during the time of research.    
5. Considering the above said conditions, a total of 84 countries were selected, which indicates the 
actual statistical population.   
 
3.1. Method of data collection and data analysis. 
 
In this paper, to collect the experimental data and to test the research hypotheses, date related to 
in/dependent and control variables were gathered from audited financial statements of companies listed 
on Tehran Stock Exchange and are available at Kadul Website (comprehensive information system for 
publishers).  Other related data were collected form social network of stock exchange and capital market 
and the official website of Tehran Stock Exchange, and in some cases from informational banks of 
Tehran Stock Exchange (IranBors, TadbirPardaz, and NovinRahavard Softwares). To make the required 
computations, the collected data were transferred to Excel Software to finalize the research variables 
based on the computational formula and to analyze final data in R software version 3,1,1. Before testing 
the hypotheses and final model fitting, we investigated the descriptive statistics (central and dispersion 
indices, namely mean, median, standard division of variation range) and research variables. 
 
4. The results. 
 
4.1. Descriptive Statistics. 
 
Descriptive findings of this research including mean, median, standard of division, minimum and 
maximum observations are illustrated in the following Table. It is worth mentioning that the number of 
companies under study presented in Table 1. 
 
Considering the results of the Tables 1 and 2, the mean of internal control quality weakness is 
0.33, which means that 33 percent of corporate structures suffer from internal control weakness. 
Moreover, unbounded managers account for 63 percent of board members. The variable of financial 
expertise of audit committee members shows that on average, 84 percent audit committee members have 
financial expertise. Financial restatements indicate that on average, 96 percent of companies represented 






Table 1. The Descriptive statistics of the study. 
 
Max Min St.d Mean Average Symbol Year-firm Variable 
9.390 3.780 0.858 6.660 6.746 LN_FEES 252 The natural log of audit fees 
0.800 0.000 0.165 0.200 0.202 POTENCY_CFO 252 Power board 
1.000 0.000 0.226 0.600 0.629 BD_IND 252 Independent board members 
45.000 5.000 5.458 13.000 15.130 BD_MEET 252 number of meetings of the Board 
7.000 3.000 0.578 3.000 3.126 POTENCY − AC 252 Power Audit Committee 
1.000 0.330 0.170 1.000 0.842 AC_𝐴𝐴C𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶_𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐶𝐶 252 
Financial expert of 
the Audit 
Committee 
34.700 15.600 8.211 30.500 26.933 𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼 252 Inflation 
18.630 1.890 1.934 13.520 13.215 LN_SALE 252 Logarithm of total sales 
19.370 9.040 1.601 13.590 13.585 LN_ASSET 252 Logarithm of total assets 
2.950 0.200 0.372 0.670 0.707 LEVERAGE 252 LEVERAGE 
0.930 -0.330 0.183 0.110 0.153 ROA 252 Return on assets 
0.460 0.000 0.061 0.030 0.047 CASH_FLOW 252 Operating cash flow 
0.890 0.130 0.195 0.540 0.532 AR_INV 252 Operational Risk 
177.000 19.000 29.078 72.000 73.452 REPORTLAG 252 REPORTLAG 
7.000 5.000 0.351 5.000 5.063 BD_SIZE 252 The number of board members 
7.000 2.000 0.496 5.000 4.880 M_GE_BD 252 Male members 
3.000 0.000 0.510 0.000 0.210 FEM_GE_BD 252 Female members 
Source: Own elaboration. 
 
 
Table 2. Descriptive statistics of the study. 
 
Total One Zero Symbol Variable 
% Number % Number % Number 
100 252 33 82 67 170 CO_W Quality of internal control 
weaknesses 
100 252 9 22 91 230 LOSS LOSS 
100 252 87 219 13 33 FOREIGN Foreign transactions 
100 252 100 252 0 0 RESTATE Restatement of Financial 
Statements 
100 252 59 148 41 104 RESIDENCE Position audit firm 
100 252 23 58 77 194 BIG Audit size 
Source: Own elaboration. 
 
Model (1): processing model for hypothesis one to five 
 
In this research, the regression method of Beck and Mauldin (2014) was employed to investigate 
effect of power of audit committee and the board on audit fees as follows: 
 
ln_FEES = β0 + β1POTENCY_CFO + β2BD_IND + β3BD_MEET  + β4POTENCY_AC                                   
+ β5AC_ACCT_EXPERT + β6 Inflation + β7ln_ASSETS + β8ln_SALE+ β9LEVERAGE + β10LOSS + 
β11ROA + β12CASH_FLOW + β13AR_INV +  β14Ind-Code + β15FOREIGN + β16REPORTLAG + 




Where the independent variable of the above pattern will be defined and identified as follows:  
 
In-FEES: natural logarithm of paid fees to auditors written in finance statements. 
POTENCY-CFO: this variable indicates the power of the board. Financial expertise of the board 
members was considered as the criteria for measuring power and penetration and the more the financial 
expertise of members, the more is the power and penetration of the board. 
BD-IND this variable indicates the percentage of independent board’s members to all members. 
We obtain such information from disclosed board data showing that several board members are bounded 
and some are unbounded managers.  
BD-MEET: is the number of the board sessions during a fiscal year. We considered it as a criterion for 
measuring the extent of board efforts. 
POTENCY-AC: such a variable indicates the power of audit committee. 
The criterion for measuring the power and penetration of audit committee is number of committee 
members. We supposed that the more the number of committee members, the more its subsequent 
power. 
AC-ACCT-EXPERT: is the number of accounting experts in audit committee, such as managers as 
independent auditors. The more the numbers of accounting and auditing expert of the audit committee, 
because of their interest in more accounting efforts, the more the audit fee would be set.  
 
In this paper, some controlling variables are use, as well, which will be defined as follows:  
 
Inflation: This variable indicates the inflation rate obtained from the central bank. We use this variable 
to indicate how much of changes in fees are resulted from changes in inflation rate. 
In ASSETS: Natural logarithm of total assets.  
IN SALE: Natural logarithm of total sale of company during the expected year.  
LEVERAGE: Division of total debts into total assets. 
LOSS: we use this variable to indicate corporate status, and if company is unprofitable and disclosed 
the issue, it obtains 1, otherwise 0.  
ROA: Division of earnings into assets.  
CASH-FLOW: A ratio of operating cash flow of company to total assets, calculated according to 
division of operating cash into assets.  
AR-INV: This variable is achieved from sum of current assets, except for cash (accounts receivable and 
inventory) divided into total assets and shows the operational risk. 
CODE-IND: this variable indicates kind of industry, for which the company operates.   
FOREIGN: if company has international exchange we attribute one, otherwise we attribute zero. 
REPORTLAG: is equal to number of days at the end of fiscal year and date of auditor's signature. 
RESTATE: if company represent the financial statements we attribute one, otherwise zero. 
RESIDENCE: if audited company and audit firm are in the same city, we attribute 1 otherwise 0. We 
set this variable because different place of company and firm would lead to the increase of audit fee and 
could affect the results. 
BIG: If a company is audited by the audit organization, we attribute 1 otherwise 0. 
BD-SIZE: is the number of board members. 
M-GEN-BD: is number of male board members. 
Fem-GEN-BD: IS number of female board members. 
𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖: Random error.  
 
4.2. F Limer Test for the model related to hypothesis one to five.  
Since data analysis and hypothesis testing is taken place by the R software, after providing the required 
identifiable information and incorporating the data, the primary model fitting should be performed using 
the four common methods. These methods simple OLS method, OLS method by considering the time 
factor, fixed and random effects panel method. F Limer test is carried out on these four methods to: 
 
1. Define the privileged model between OLS and fixed effects panel data. H0 hypothesis indicates 
that OLS is superior.   
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2. Define the privileged model between timed OLS and fixed effects panel method. H0 hypothesis 
indicates that OLS is superior.  
 
Concerning the abovementioned items, the results of F Limer test are as follows:  
 
Table 3. The results of F Limer (chow) test for model related to hypothesis one to five. 
  
Result P - Value  F statistic Hypothesis H0 
Panel model is more appropriate  0.001> 4.411 Superiority of OLS model 
Panel model is more appropriate  0.001> 4.338 Superiority of timed OLS model 
Source: Own elaboration. 
 
The results of Flimer test for the model related to research hypotheses show that the related data 
follow the panel method.  
 
Hausman test for the model related to hypothesis one to five. Having finalized the use of panel 
data method, we need to specify whether the panel model should have fixed effects or whether it requires 
random effects. Therefore, we used the Hausman test, the result of which can be seen in Table 4. 
 
Table 4. The results of Hausman test for the model related to hypothesis one to five. 
 
Result P-Value  Chi-square statistic Hypothesis H0 
Fixed effects panel method is more 
appropriate  0.001> 108.437 Superiority of OLS model 
Source: Own elaboration. 
 
Regarding the acceptance of null hypothesis of Hausman test, we could conclude that the method 
of parameter estimation is the fixed effects model.  
 
LM test for the model related to hypothesis one to five. Prior to fitting of fixed effects model, we 
need to check whether we can merge time and space factors or not. Hence, we employed Lagrange 
Multiplier-Breusch- Pagan test (LM), the result of  integrability test for the model regarding the values 
of Chi-square statistics deriving from Lagrange Multiplier-Breusch- Pagan test, we could conclude that 
the merged method of time factors is appropriate for model fitting.  
 
Evaluating the autocorrelation of residuals. One of the features of evaluation through application 
of merged panel models is the absence of autocorrelation among the error terms. Breusch-Godfrey test 
is employed fot this purpose. The results of this test on model disturbing elements, based on the R 
Software, are as follows:  
 
Table 5. The result of Breusch-Godfrey test for model related to hypothesis one to five. 
 
Result P-Value  Chi-square statistic Hypothesis H0 
serial autocorrelation is 
existed  001/0*** <  25.381 
No serial autocorrelation among error 
terms 




Since the p-value of Breusch-Godfrey test is less than 0.001, the null hypothesis of this test as to 
the absence of serial autocorrelation among the disturbing elements is rejected, so error terms have serial 
autocorrelation. The presence of serial autocorrelation among model residuals could cause a bias in 
model estimation. PGLM is used to resolve this problem, for better estimation of model parameters, and 
for the final fitting.  
 
Table 6. Results of final model fitting related to hypothesis one to five. 
 
P-value t stat Std Dev R2 Symbol Variable 
** 0.009 2.578 0.973 2.509 α0 Intercept 
0.388 0.862 0.243 0.209 POTENCY_CFO Board power 
*0.039 -2.055 0.206 -0.423 BD_IND Independent board members 
0.544 0.606 0.008 0.005 BD_MEET Number of meetings of the board 
* 0.024 -2.252 0.075 -0.170 POTENCY_AC Audit Committee Power 
** 0.008 2.646 0.258 0.683 AC_ACCT_EXPE
RT 
Financial expert of the Audit 
Committee 
*** 0.001> -5.857 0.002 -0.016 INFLATION inflation 
** 0.005 2.774 0.035 0.098 LN_SALE Logarithm of total sales 
*** 0.001 3.404 0.047 0.163 LN_ASSET Logarithm of total assets 
0.377 0.883 0.109 0.097 LEVERAGE leverage 
** 0.008 -2.632 0.110 -0.290 LOSS loss 
0.157 -1.415 0.166 -0.235 ROA Return on assets 
0.145 1.456 0.538 0.782 CASH_FLOW Operating cash flow 
0.949 0.063 0.211 0.013 AR_INV Operational Risk 
0.648 -0.456 0.160 -0.073 FOREIGN Foreign transactions 
0.091 1.689 0.001 0.002 REPORTLAG REPORTLAG 
0.517 -0.648 0.244 -0.158 RESTATE Restatement of Financial 
Statements 
0.226 1.219 0.112 0.136 RESIDENCE Position audit firm 
0.001>***  5.579 0.116 0.647 BIG Audit size 
0.704 -0.379 0.299 -0.113 BD_SIZE The number of board members 
0.195 1.296 0.278 0.360 M_GE_BD Male members 
0.234 1.189 0.266 0.317 FEM_GE_BD Female members 
Source: Own elaboration. 
 
Model (2) fitting model for hypothesis six to ten. 
 
In this research, logistic regression model of Beck and Mauldin (2014) was used to evaluate the 
effect of audit committee and the board power on the weakness of internal control quality. 
Co-w = β0 + β1POTENCY_CFO + β2BD_IND + β3BD_MEET + β4POTENCY_AC + 
β5AC_ACCT_EXPERT + β6 Inflation + β7ln_ASSETS + β8ln_SALE+ β9LEVERAGE + β10LOSS + 
β11ROA + β12CASH_FLOW + β13AR_INV +  β14Ind-Code + β15FOREIGN + β16REPORTLAG + 
β17RESTATE + β18RESIDENCE + β19BIG1 + β20BD_SIZE + β21M-GE_BD+ β22FEM-GE_BD + ε 
 
Where: 
Co-w: if company shows an important weakness in its reports, we attribute one, otherwise zero. This 
audit report variable emphasizes on special issues regulated by auditors according to a set of presented 
checklists by the Stock Exchange for internal controls. In case some significant problems being explored 
a descriptive clause will be added in this section.  
 
Since the above model is a type of combinational data, its appropriate estimation should be 
defined using the Akaic criteria (AIC). Thus, we estimate the above Logit pattern using four methods of 
simple Glm, time-series GLM method (only by considering the time factor), and fixed and random 
effects panel method and compare the AIC criteria. Each model with smaller AIC will be used as the 




Table 7. Results of AIC statistics for hypothesis six to ten. 
 
Regression logistic 




with fixed effects 
Timed Logistic 
Model 
Normal  Logistic 
model Identification Criteria 
331.368 331.368 338.642 337.639 AIC Coefficient 
Source: Own elaboration. 
 
By considering the above table and AIC values of each 4 mentioned models, we could conclude 
that panel logistic regression model with fixed or random effects, because of having the lowest AIC 
value, is the most appropriate. Since the fitting results of the two models are similar, one of two models 
is fitted and results were displayed in Table 8. 
 
Table 8. Results of final fitting of model related to hypothesis six to ten. 
 
P-value t stat Std Dev R2 Symbol Variable 
0.092 1.682 0.810 1.363 α0 Intercept 
0.151 -1.437 0.215 -0.308 POTENCY_CFO Board Power  
0.323 0.988 0.177 0.175 BD_IND Independent board members 
0.859 -0.177 0.007 -0.001 BD_MEET Number of meetings of the Board 
0.712 -0.369 0.060 -0.022 POTENCY_AC Audit Committee Power 
0.100 -1.642 0.210 -0.346 AC_ACCT_EXPERT Financial expert of the Audit Committee 
0.316 1.001 0.003 0.003 INFLATION Inflation 
0.345 0.935 0.034 -0.032 LN_SALE Logarithm of total sales 
0.096 1.662 0.043 0.073 LN_ASSET Logarithm of total assets 
0.066 -1.833 0.099 -0.183 LEVERAGE Leverage 
0.739 0.332 0.112 0.037 LOSS Loss 
0.154 -1.423 0.169 -0.240 ROA Return on assets 
0.606 -0.515 0.544 -0.280 CASH_FLOW Operating cash flow 
0.349 0.936 0.197 0.185 AR_INV Operational Risk 
0.309 -1.017 0.125 -0.128 FOREIGN Foreign transactions 
0.105 1.622 0.001 0.002 REPORTLAG REPORTLAG 
<0.001***  -3.551 0.207 -0.735 RESTATE Restatement of Financial Statements 
0.285 1.069 0.086 0.092 RESIDENCE Position audit firm 
0.110 -1.595 0.094 -0.149 BIG Audit size 
0.188 -1.316 0.251 -0.330 BD_SIZE The number of board members 
0.440 0.772 0.238 0.183 M_GE_BD Male members 
0.366 0.903 0.228 0.206 FEM_GE_BD Female members 




The first hypothesis investigated the relationship between power of the board and audit fee. Since the P-
value of this variable is 0.388 and more than the significance level of 0.05, so the hypothesis is rejected 
and there is no significant relationship these two factors.  
 
The first hypothesis was based on the regression model of Beck and Mauldin (2014). Despite a 
positive relationship between power of the board and audit fee, there is no significant relationship 
between these two variables. This conclusion is in conflict with results of Harris (2008), Reason (2010b), 
and McCracken et al. (2008) who declared that there is a negative relationship between power of the 




On the other hand, lack of  significant relationship between power of the board and audit fee is in 
conflict with the results of Beck and Mauldin (2014), Carcello et al. (2002) and Cohen et al. (2010) who 
revealed that there is a significant relationship between the board power and audit fee. 
 
The second hypothesis evaluated the relationship between board member Independence 
(unbounded members) and audit fee. Since the p-value of this variable is 0.039 and less than the 
significance level of 0.05, so the hypothesis is accepted and is indicative of a significant relationship 
between board member independence and audit fee. Since the t statistic of board member independence 
has a negative relationship with audit fee, it means that by increasing the percentage of independence of 
board members, audit fee will reflect a decreasing trend. The presence of a significant relationship 
between board member independence and audit fee is in conflict with the results of studies conducted 
by Boo and Sharme (2008) and Leventis and Dimitropoulos (2010). 
 
The third assumption assessed the relationship between board effort (criteria for measuring is the 
number of board sessions) with audit fee. Since the P-value of this variable is 0.544 and is more than 
the significance level of 0.05, so this hypothesis is rejected. Therefore, there is no meaningful 
relationship between board effort and audit fee. Lack of significant relationship between board effort 
and audit fee is in conflict with results of study performed by Yatim (2006). 
 
The fourth hypothesis studied the relationship between audit committee power and audit fee. 
Since the P-value of this variable is 0.024 and less 0.05 at significance level, so this hypothesis is 
accepted and there is a significant relationship between audit committee power and audit fee. Since the 
t statistic of the relationship between audit committee power and audit fee is negative, it means that by 
increasing the power of audit committee, audit fee will indicate a decreasing trend. Such a result is in 
line with the results of Brown and Wright (2008), DeZoort et al. (2008), and Krishnan and Visvanathan 
(2009) in terms of existence of significant relationship between audit committee power and audit fee 
and is in conflict with them in terms of presence of positive or negative relationship. 
 
The fifth hypothesis investigated the relationship between the financial expertises of audit 
committee members with audit fee. Since the p-value of this variable is 0.008 and less than the 
significance level of 0.05, so the hypothesis id accepted. Since the relationship between the financial 
expertise of audit committee members and audit fees is positive, it means that by increasing financial 
expertise of audit committee members the audit fees will show an increasing trend. This significant and 
positive relationship is in line with results of Carcello et al. (2002), Abbott et al. (2003), and Vafeas et 
al. (2007) but is in conflict with the results Krishnan and Visvanathan (2009) in terms of positive or 
negative relationship. However, in terms of existence of a relationship, all mentioned studies are in line 
with the result of this hypothesis.  
 
The sixth hypothesis studied the relationship between the board power and weakness of internal 
control quality. Since the P-value of this variable is 0.151 and more than the significance level of 0.05, 
so this hypothesis rejected. Therefore, there is no significant relationship between the board power and 
weakness of internal control quality. Despite the presence of a negative relationship between these two 
variables, no significant relationship was seen between these two variables. Such a result is in conflict 
witch result of Jensen (1993), Stevens et al. (1978) and Ogneva et al. (2007). 
 
The seventh hypothesis evaluated the relationship between board member independence and 
weakness of internal control quality. Since the P-value of this variable is 0.323 and more than the 
significance level of 0.05, so this hypothesis is rejected. Therefore, there is no significant relationship 
between board member independence and weakness of internal control quality. Lack of a significant 
relationship between these two variable is in conflict with the results of Fernández and Arrondo (2005), 
Chidambaran et al. (2010), Hoitash et al. (2011) and Ogneva et al. (2007). 
 
The eight hypothesis investigated the relationship between the board efforts and weakness of 
internal control quality. The P-value of this variable is 0.859 and more than the significance level of 
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0.05, so this hypothesis is rejected. Therefore, there is no significant relationship between the board 
effort and weakness of internal control quality. 
 
The ninth hypothesis evaluated the relationship between audit committee power and weakness of 
internal control quality. The P-value of this variable is 0.712 and more than the significance level of 
0.05. Therefore, this hypothesis is rejected and there is no significant relationship between audit 
committee power and weakness of internal control quality. This result is in conflict with the results of 
Krishnan (2005). 
 
The last hypothesis assessed the relationship between financial expertise of audit committee 
members and weakness of internal control quality. The P-value of this variable is 0.100 and more than 
significance level of 0.05, so this hypothesis is rejected.  Therefore, there is no significant relationship 
between financial expertise of audit committee members and weakness of internal control quality. This 
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